By Marcos Buser & Walter Wildi

Figure 1: Screenshot of the image accompanying the article “In 100 years, the repository will be closed – or maybe sooner?” by Nagra, published on March 20, 2025, Text: “… repository closed – or even earlier”.

When does «finality» begin?

“When does ‘finality’ begin? According to current planning, in 100 years, that is, in 2125. Then the Swiss deep geological repository for radioactive waste is to be closed completely,” says a Nagra article dated March 20, 2025, titled ”In 100 years the repository will be closed – or perhaps sooner?” The mentioned contribution introduces the topic of the final disposal of Swiss radioactive waste.[1] And the title already contains a term that, according to the law, should no longer be part of the official Swiss waste disposal vocabulary: the final repository. If it were up to the plans of these Nagra authors, at least nine hundred and ninety thousand nine hundred (999,900) years of finality would follow the closure of their repository – even if it were to be accelerated – during which the waste would remain at a depth of around 800 meters, unaffected by events on the surface. According to this line of thinking, no one would think of recovering and reusing the stored uranium (and initially also the plutonium) for almost a million years. Nor would any state or other power group consider retrieving this waste to arm themselves for military conflicts during this period. Serious social unrest would not lead to the opening or damaging of the final disposal facility, nor would the search for resources and drinking water, geothermal drilling or archaeological curiosity. Above all, however, according to such considerations, there would be no technical development for almost a million years that would allow penetration to a depth of 800 meters with simple means. In this sense, finality would be equated with total standstill.

Considering the development of drilling technology since the first core drilling in the Spindletop oil field in Texas (120 years ago) and the advances in shaft-sinking and tunnel-boring machines in recent decades alone, it is surprising to wonder how the idea of a complete standstill in the exploration of the underground can arise at all. And anyone who has witnessed the rapid progress of underground exploration in recent decades will hardly doubt that the drilling in the “Swiss underground cheese” will continue at the same speed and density. With the effect that the intrusion into a deep geological repository is unlikely to be prevented. The authorities’ planned spatial planning protection measures will not help either. Decrees and prohibitions to protect infrastructure or sacred areas have never worked since ancient times, as can be seen from countless examples. Who today cares about Hadrian’s hydraulic engineering reforms and his prohibition signs? – a preserved one at Chagnon at the foot of the Roman aqueduct of Gier near Lyon still bears witness to this today. Who is interested in the inscriptions in the Holy Land, Egypt or Mesopotamia that were marked with threats of curse to protect shrines and tombs?[2] Who is interested in the ancient curse formulas against those “who destroy, damage, embezzle clay tablets, etc.” [3] Archaeological evidence confirms to this day that no permanent protection of objects is possible, as the recent past shows in connection with the destruction of cultural property by radical Islamic groups in the last 2 decades[4]. It is and remains illusory to impose entry bans on any objects as part of historical processes or to protect them from looting and destruction. No contract or catalogue of duties that is designed to be valid forever is ultimately protected against breach. No object with recyclable materials is fundamentally protected against future recycling. The fact that humans have historically been extremely skilled at reusing and recycling is a well-established and now banal archaeological fact.[5] And so we have to ask ourselves how the ultimate integrity of a deep geological repository and its monitoring will be guaranteed. This also calls into question the “finality” cited by the Nagra authors.

Why this acceleration?

The commission “Disposal concepts for radioactive waste ([Entsorgungskonzepte radioaktive Abfälle]” EKRA) introduced the monitoring of facilities for a period of time to be determined by society for both material and acceptance reasons.[6] Now, the authors of the above-mentioned article in Nagra are calling for the timetable for closing the repository to be shortened even further and for the closure process to be accelerated. This means that the fundamental essence of monitoring by a pilot facility and the principles laid down in the nuclear energy law and ordinance are being undermined by the project developer or approved by the experts of the supervisory authority without parliamentary or technical discussion. This is justified by citing war and crises, which would require a faster closure of the repository, as the pictorial representation at the beginning of this article shows (Figure 1). Consequently, one would then have to forget the “repository” – as also envisaged in the Finnish concept – so that “finality” can begin. You wouldn’t need to monitor anything at all in a facility designed for “finality”. 

Of course, such a scenario for the future can be envisaged. It would then be advisable to at least check how consistent such arguments are, in order to avoid being exposed by the justifications used. On the one hand, these considerations relate to the aforementioned arsenal of devices for underground exploration or for retrieving the waste for recycling. On the other hand, however, it also refers to the risk posed by radioactive waste from existing plants to humans and the environment. Until the repository is closed, highly radioactive fuel elements are stored inadequately protected from “crises, war and apocalypse” in the Swiss landscape for decades or longer: 4 reactors with their fuel elements and their decay storage facilities at three locations, two interim storage facilities at two NPP sites (Zwibez, Gösgen), one of which has wet storage of spent fuel elements, two further interim storage facilities on the site of the Paul Scherrer Institute (Zwilag, BZL). All concrete blocks without any special protective effect in the event of military or terrorist nuclear or non-nuclear emergencies. Should we not rather ask ourselves whether long-term underground interim storage (and possibly a fundamental transfer of nuclear facilities underground) might not provide better protection for the civilian population than a rushed acceleration program to seal a deep geological repository in about 100 years? 

One could also ask how the threat situations have developed since the Second World War. The attached figure 2 from the report of one of the blog authors from 2014 shows the development in the construction of nuclear reactors in the context of the Cold War. In the period when the Cold War entered its hottest phase, the most nuclear power plants (and interim storage facilities) were built and put into operation on the surface – whether in Europe, America or the Soviet Union. In this context, the nuclear-friendly side (including the Nagra) remained surprisingly quiet about crises, wars and the apocalypse! Now that several hundred of these old reactors are still in operation worldwide with their interim storage facilities, and major plans for new reactors are being developed for the future – including in Switzerland – the Swiss waste management company wants to accelerate a program to close the deep geological repository in northern Switzerland. With the argument of the risk of crisis and war!

Figure 2: Development of nuclear risks over time[7]

Corrigendum: ZWILAG = central storage facility at Würenlingen

The discussion in Switzerland since the 1980s about the “shepherding” of highly radioactive waste over “eternity” has shown the fundamental vulnerability of long-term safe storage of highly toxic waste in artificial mausoleums on the surface for decades. Representatives of Nagra – above all the former head of “Communication and Public Affairs” – are therefore keen to use these arguments in lectures to draw attention to the longer-term nuclear dangers of waste in superficial facilities. For example, with an image of the devastating bombing of Dresden in February 1945 (Figure 3). The aim was to show that only underground storage of radioactive materials could guarantee sufficient safety in the event of a crisis or war. This narrative is also followed by the article by Nagra quoted in the introduction, which is based on the expert report “Closure Measures in Crisis Situations” commissioned by ENSI and prepared by the consulting firm Basler&Hoffmann, which also develops apocalyptic scenarios (p. 15-16) and messages to justify the rapid closure of a deep geological repository that has been converted into a final disposal site. [8]

Figure 3: The image frequently used by Nagra’s former head of “Communication & Public Affairs” to symbolize the destruction of nuclear facilities on the surface, based on the Allied bombings of German cities at the end of the Second World War.

The conclusion that underground storage is undoubtedly safer than above-ground alternatives is correct, provided that the operational risks underground can be guaranteed. But then, by the same token, we must also ask why risk technologies such as nuclear technology were and are developed in a superordinate context and distributed across the entire landscape, and why they continue to be operated in other European countries, if the Swiss deep geological repository were already closed. The apocalyptic rhetoric that Nagra has dusted off to support and defend its own strategy of underground storage unnecessarily fuels fears and does not in the least help to mitigate the actual risks. As the Romanian historian Lucian Boia aptly noted decades ago in his excellent and humorously written history of the apocalypses: the end of the world really is a story without end. [9]

No alternatives for the disposal of HLW? 

The preferences in the development and selection of disposal strategies reflect existing structures and well-established decision-making systems and patterns. In accordance with the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the license holder is responsible for planning and defining a disposal program. The regulatory body is assigned to a state regulatory authority. It is the general formula of the polluter-pays principle applied to nuclear technology: the polluter manages, and the supervisory authority reviews the project planning documents submitted – but should not and must not be involved in strategic and planning matters. In this way, the definition of a strategy for disposal is the responsibility of a single player, regardless of their vested interests or their abilities and willingness to ensure a regular and systematic review of disposal options and alternatives. This is undoubtedly a glaring weakness or design flaw in the (in itself reasonable) polluter pays principle, as is also clearly demonstrated by the problem of contaminated sites. It must be possible to identify and correct mistakes early on and throughout the duration of a planning process. However, this is rarely possible through the planning organization, because it is too close to its own project and therefore subject to the trap of bias. As a result, program corrections usually arise from a project failure or from external influences (criticism from civil society, science, authorities, etc.). This insight is not only valid for Switzerland. Even the IAEA Joint Convention does not help here, as it only addresses quality management in general and in rudimentary terms and neglects conceptual planning (Article 23).[10] Thinking, questioning and correcting are imperative to ensure high-quality projects.[11]

In recent decades, the international nuclear community has unequivocally endorsed the path of final geological disposal. Under the given conditions and framework, it was therefore understandable that Switzerland, too, became fixated on the disposal path of the final repository at a depth of several hundred meters, regardless of the increasing problems that arose when implementing specific projects. [12] The emerging option of the transmutation project “Transmutex”, which is to be examined, could fundamentally question the path taken so far towards an underground disposal facility. The conditions for the storage/disposal of radioactive wastes with or without transmutation are significantly different. But it can also be expected in other technological fields that leaps in innovation will be made in the foreseeable future, with significantly improved encapsulation techniques for long-lived radioactive waste. This in turn will result in a different way of handling such immobilized residues and could lead to new strategies for depleted residues with a limited storage/disposal period. This implicitly means that it is not really advisable to insist on the strategy of underground mines with waste encapsulated in large storage containers made of steel and other alloys. This is because the safety case for a final or deep repository is never made by means of factual evidence, but through probability calculations regarding the long-term development of the object. However, such a safety case is always inferior to a physical and chemical treatment of waste materials. It is therefore imperative that we expand our consideration, analysis and development of further possible, technically supported disposal options. However, this presupposes that such a process is also accompanied by a willingness to engage in a scientifically open exchange of ideas and opinions.

Independence in scientific thought

As can be seen from the introductory article by Nagra, such an opening is not taking place. Arguments and suggestions that do not fit into the own narrative of the deep geological repository or that would question it are therefore ignored as far as possible. The method used is simple: one remains silent on the unpleasant topic as much as possible and sits out the emerging criticism, in the hope that it will then resolve itself. One only reacts if it cannot be avoided, as in the case of question 181 in the Technical Forum on Safety. It is a well-known pattern that has accompanied the Swiss history of radioactive waste disposal (and not only Switzerland) since its beginning. Fundamental planning issues have always been particularly controversial in this historical process. However, the project developers have been fending off the scientific and social criticism expressed from the outset, even when it later turned out that the wrong path had been chosen and the complaints were justified. But neither Nagra nor the responsible authorities have ever admitted their mistakes or errors afterwards. Neither from Nagra nor from the relevant authorities. A culture of error worthy of the name could therefore not develop under the given conditions. Free thinking without a guard rail, as the philosopher Hannah Arendt put it, or the conscious integration of criticism and contradiction into an open scientific process, was not in the interest of an interest-bound organization like Nagra, nor of the responsible state institutions. Instead of promoting the principle of thematic openness, the cooperative always defended a project-related and thus narrow way of working, which meant that it closed itself off to possible alternatives and had to make painful subsequent corrections to its basic planning.

In the current context, the old defensive reflex of proactively taking up and examining new options and alternatives for nuclear waste disposal is once again recurring. The transmutation strategy is definitely an unwelcome competitor to the final disposal strategy for highly radioactive waste and actually puts its plans into perspective in a very fundamental way. In this situation, an updated compass is needed all the more, one that allows potential paths to be re-examined in the light of ongoing technological developments and to set the course in other directions at an early stage. At a time when major advances in the recovery and treatment of highly radioactive waste materials could emerge, it is prudent to address these new technological developments and their implications. The “finality” claimed by the final disposal concept in dealing with highly radioactive waste could very well soon be replaced by a new paradigm of comprehensive treatment and risk reduction of the highly toxic radioactive inventory.

[1] https://nagra.ch/in-100-jahren-wird-das-endlager-verschlossen-oder-doch-frueher-verschluss/

[2] Assmann, Jan, 1993. Altorientalische Fluchinschriften und das Problem performativer Schriftlichkeit. Vertrag und Monument als Allegorien des Lesens. In: Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich, Pfeiffer, K.Ludwig (Hg.), Schrift (Materialität der Zeichen : Reihe A, 12), Munich 1993, pp. 233-255. http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/3491/1/Assmann_Altorientalische_Fluchinschriften_1993.pdf(29.03 5)

[3] Assmann, Jan, 1993. P. 253-254

[4] Destruction of the Bamian statues in Afghanistan, the Timbutku manuscripts in Mali or the historical Babylonian cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIE2cfC9i

[6] EKRA, 2000. Disposal Concepts for Radioactive Waste. Final report. On behalf of the Federal Department for the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication January 2000.

[7] INA 2014. «Hüten» versus «Endlagern»: eine Standortbestimmung 2014. Institut für nachhaltige Abfallwirtschaft. Zuhanden Eidg. Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat. https://www.ensi.ch/de/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/hueten_vs_endlagern_2014-ensi_marcos_buser.pdf (31.03.2025)

[8] See also the criticism of the Basler&Hoffmann report published in the summer of 2019: https://www.nuclearwaste.info/verschlussmassnahmen-in-krisensituationen-eine-analyse-des-expertenberichts-basler-hofmann-2018-im-auftrag-der-aufsichtsbehoerden/. A now published article by Nagra dated March 31, 25, argues similarly about interim storage. https://nagra.ch/zwischenlagerung-wo-sind-unsere-radioaktiven-abfaelle/

[9] Boia, Lucian, 1999. La fin du monde – une histoire sans fin. Ed. Découverte.

[10] Joint Convention, ARTICLE 23. QUALITY ASSURANCE Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are established and implemented. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc546.pdf (31.3.2025)

[11] On successful planning, see the numerous articles by Flyvbjerg Bent, including the book “How Big Things Get Done”, published in 2023. See also the numerous interviews on youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNvs4YqI18A

[12] Cf. the articles published on this blog for years on the weaknesses of specific final disposal projects such as Asse II, Morsleben, WIPP, Stocamine, etc.