Cover photo: Rock, water and moss; a taste of final disposal? Former research gallery and today’s exhibition area at the Olkiluoto site.
Repositories for low and intermediate level radioactive waste in Sweden and Finland: a travel report
By Marcos Buser
Between 20 and 28 May 2019, the author attended various workshops on society’s handling of radioactive waste in Sweden and therefore took the opportunity to visit the low and intermediate level waste repositories at the Forsmark (Östhammar, Sweden) and Olkiluoto (Finland) nuclear power plants. This report attempts to provide answers to the question of the significance of the repository strategies and concepts pursued, in particular to the question of the safety of such installations over longer periods of time.
Fig. 1: Community centre in Östhammar on 23 May 2019, photo M. Buser
In the 1960s and 1970s, engineers and geologists increasingly began to ask questions about the environmental impact of landfills. Of course, the focus was on groundwater, which showed increasing and clear signs of pollution from such waste deposits. The early experiences with groundwater pollution led the experts responsible for the planning and realization of landfills over the course of the next decades to provide for a multi-barrier system to prevent possible harmful discharges into the environment. This included not only basic seals poured or constructed from various natural or artificially produced materials, drainage systems for seepage water and surface seals made of different layers of earth and artificial materials, but also a large number of technical treatment plants for the collection and treatment of landfill seepage water and gases. Even then, people were talking about barriers and multiple barriers.
However, none of the protective systems under consideration was able to guarantee the objective of permanent insulation of the waste material deposited in landfills. Mostly after a few years, and at best after a few decades, the waste water from the landfill seeped through the protective barriers and polluted the groundwater again – despite the increasingly extensive calculations and modelling of the possible pollutant discharge from the landfills starting in the late 1980s. At some point, the responsible authorities had to admit that there was no retention system that would ensure lasting protection of the environment from harmful emissions. Even the layers that had been traded as geologically “impermeable” for decades failed. Models and discharge scenarios could not do the math about pollution of the environment. Today, even the majority of experts are of the opinion that landfills are nothing more than dilution plants in time. Exemplary for this development are also hazardous waste landfills, which were once praised throughout Europe as models for landfill planning in the future and – such as the swiss plants in Bonfol (JU) or Kölliken (AG) – only a few decades later had to be completely excavated and cleaned-up again. Within only a few decades, a fundamental paradigm shift took place with regard to the “disposal” of highly toxic waste in man-made facilities and the importance of a tight geological barrier in the subsoil. The first signs of a shift in disposal strategies and concepts can also be observed in the handling of the radioactive legacy, as can be seen from a number of cases in the last decade.
Requestioning the underground disposal of hazardous waste
Until 2008, the world of “nuclear waste disposal” seemed to be intact. When media reports reached the public this year that day caustic solutions – i.e. groundwater – had reached the mine in the experimental final storage repository at Asse in Wolfenbüttel, the outrage was great. The repository had been closed down in 1979. Ten years later, the water influxes began and reached the storage chambers of the waste stored there. The operator of the plant had concealed the inflows for a full twenty years. The public at the sites reacted in consternation. Just like the responsible institutions, which had to lament a noticeable loss of trust. The previous operator of the plant, the Helmholtz Society, was deprived of control of the plant. From then on, the Federal Office for Radiation Protection assumed responsibility for the plant and the remediation project – a communication “melt down” concerning the management, transparency and information policy of the project. Little by little, the unpleasant facts came to light. For example, the systematic underestimation of the hydrogeological risks by the responsible management of the repository, which had already been described in detail in an expert report by the geologist Hans-Helge Jürgens in 1979. The conscious as well as systematic cover-up of the water inflow. The maintenance of the fiction of dry salt. Finally, the gaps in knowledge in connection with the effectively stored waste inventory, whose plutonium stocks now had to be continuously corrected upwards. Within just a few decades, the Asse II facility transformed itself from an internationally acclaimed showcase project (see Figure 2) into an actual scandalous facility that had to be rehabilitated at the taxpayer’s expense. Nevertheless, neither the former heads of the plant nor the international and national organizations that presented the Asse II project as a model project at the time felt compelled to stand by their misjudgment. The question raised by the Atomic Energy Agency on the title page about “where to” remains open.
Figure 2: Cross-section of the Asse experimental repository mine as a model for the disposal of radioactive waste: Title page of the brochure “Radioactive waste – Where from Where to” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Photo (for free use, stating the article) : M. Buser.
At the end of the 1970s, the Asse model was used worldwide as a model for the disposal of radioactive waste, including in the 1978 published concept of the Swiss nuclear industry. In the meantime, these organizations are silent about the fate of the plant and their early enthusiasm for this disposal model is gone.
The Asse II scandal was followed by further bad news. In the Morsleben mine (Ingersleben), the East German sister repository of the Asse mine in Saxony-Anhalt, water also began to trickle into the mine and the responsible authorities feared that additional crevasses and other waterways could occur in the unstable mine galleries. The mining chambers of Morsleben therefore had also to be stabilized, i.e. backfilled, without any guarantee that water would not be able to reach the stored waste at any time. Again, the public authorities were asked to pay. A detailed analysis of this history is still lacking today.
The next blow followed in February 2014. The “Waste Isolation Pilot Plant” (WIPP) near Carlsbad (New Mexico), which had been praised by the international nuclear industry as a beacon project for more than one and a half decades, lamented two accidents within 10 days that fundamentally questioned the design and management of the mine. On 5 February, a salt haul truck burnt out almost completely, revealing the desolate maintenance of the equipment and the shortcomings in the underground fire-fighting programs: inadequate safety culture, inadequate fire monitoring, inadequate fire protection equipment, inadequate training, education and training of personnel, ineffective safety concept as a whole, etc. The list of malfunctions and mismanagement of this minor accident alone can be found in the investigation reports of the Department of Energy (2014a). 
Less than 9 days later, a second accident occurred which fundamentally questioned the entire safety culture of the plant. A barrel containing transuranic waste exploded after the Los Alamos laboratory responsible for the accident neglected the packaging instructions and used organic and thus reactive cat litter to absorb any liquids from the chemical separation of the reprocessed uranium and plutonium. A mistake that revealed the neglect of the entire safety chain. A part of the plant was contaminated by the radioactive substances to such an extent that the closure and decontamination of the affected areas became necessary. Small amounts of radioactive substances were blown out into the environment because the air filtration system had leaks. The reports of the Department of Energy (DOE 2014b, 2015) already leave no doubt about the catastrophic safety culture that had been established over time.  Even more dramatic, however, are the descriptions of the shortcomings in the management of the plant, which became apparent after interviews with the responsible personnel.  What, according to risk calculations, should have happened every 200,000 years, happened after only 2 decades. The plant was renovated and put back into operation after a few years. The cost of the direct rehabilitation work was over 600 million dollars, the cost of further measures over 2 billion dollars in total. Hundreds more wrongly conditioned barrels remained underground: their retrieval is thus de facto impossible, the plant can no longer be rehabilitated and reversibility is once again a paper tiger. The insight of operators and supervisory authorities that a wrong concept has been implemented here is still not discernible. News of further safety-relevant incidents in the plant is likely to continue. In 2017, the secured section of a ceiling collapsed (Figure 3). And at some point operators and authorities will also have to admit that the waste originally stored as retrievable could no longer be removed.
Figure 3: Ceiling collapse in a secured tunnel area (https://nukewatchinfo.org/deep-waste-dump-rewarded-for-failure-reopened-with-contaminated-environment/ [21.06.2019)]
But that’s not all: not only deep geological repositories began to leak. The radioactive landfills on the surface also continued to hit the headlines. The scenario known for decades was repeated. Time works relentlessly and reveals the weak points of this landfill system: in the Beatty landfill in Nevada, where low- and intermediate-level waste as well as chemotoxic waste was stored, explosions with serious consequences occurred in 2017.  In this case, too, the chemical inventory reacted retrospectively and showed once again that the storage systems pursued are not under control in the long term.
A similar situation occurred at the Stocamine underground storage site near Mulhouse (France) when a fire broke out in September 2002 and the plant was definitively shut down.  Same security gaps and deficits, same defence strategies of overburdened operators and authorities. Their promises to take back the waste were broken. Today, the recovery of the waste is being delayed further with the comment that it is too dangerous to retreive the waste under the mining conditions prevailing today. The principle of reversibility promised by operators and authorities has just been left over. And the longer-term consequences generally accepted by experts, according to which water would penetrate into the repository and then be polluted and pressed back into the environment and groundwater, do not seem to bother the official authorities. Stocamine is only the tip of the iceberg that is slowly emerging from the fog. Other repositories for chemotoxic waste, such as the southern German salt mines in Heilbronn and Stetten/Haigerloch, are, in view of their geological situation and shallow location, particularly obvious candidates for the continuation of an extraordinarily unpleasant, risky and expensive history of repositories and pollution.
Final storage under and next to a sea
Sweden: On 23 May 2019 I was able to visit the Swedish repository for low and intermediate level waste in Östhammar, about 100 km north of Stockholm, together with other scientists and experts. This facility has been operated by Nagra’s Swedish counterpart SKB since 1988 as a so-called Short Half Life Radioactive Waste Repository (SFR). The repository contains a collection of the usual power plant waste from all Swedish nuclear power plants, from lightly contaminated clothing, gloves and shoes to contaminated objects and tools and ion exchange resins for filtering the radioactively contaminated cooling water in the primary cooling circuit. In addition, there is a wide range of wastes from medicine, industry and research (MIF). The total capacity of the plant is 63,000 m3. The storage period is stated to be at least 500 years.
Access to the repository is from the reception area via a flat ramp, which extends to a depth of about 50 m below the surface (Figures 4 and 5). This ramp is connected to various storage tunnels and a silo with appropriate loading infrastructures (reloading stations, crane runways, etc.).
Figure 4: Receiving facility SFR (https://www.skb.com/our-operations/sfr/ [4.6.2019])
Red arrow: Portal area of the access tunnel to SFR
Figure 5: Model overview of the SFR with the four 160 m long rear storage tunnels and the silo with infrastructure tunnels in the foreground (after https://www.skb.com/our-operations/sfr/ [4.6.2019])
As can be seen from Figure 4, the repository is located directly below the shallow Baltic Sea at this point at a depth of approx. 50 m. The following technical descriptions are taken from the English version of the SKB website.  Four storage galleries, about 160 m long, take up the cement-bonded or otherwise conditioned containers. The 50 m high silo is loaded and filled using a crane runway, which picks up the waste in a reloading station. The entire plant is embedded in crystalline rocks, so-called “medium-grain metagranites” of the Baltic Shield. The uplift movements of the mountains after the melting of the mighty ice shield at the end of the last ice age continue: the mountains rise 0.5 cm per year.  Sometime in about 1000 years, the shallow sea arm will have retreated by lifting the rock mass. But even then, seawater and groundwater will remain the main source of threats to the shallow repository.
The transport into the repository takes place with a bus. After a short drive, the visitor guide instructs the visitors to get off the bus. Afterwards it goes on foot few hundred meters further. What the visitor sees first and foremost is an exhibition on the repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste and the repository for high-level radioactive waste: a drum of clothing is on display, as is the 5-ton copper canister, which will one day hold the storage containers with the irradiated, highly radioactive fuel elements. In addition there will be billboards with explanations and models. Photography prohibited. The plant is to be extended, because also the wastes from the nuclear power plant dismantling are to be inserted here in a further down lying floor. At a depth of 120 m. Total capacity with the previous plant around 200’000 m3.
At the end of the small exhibition gallery, a concrete wall with a glass viewing window is embedded. It allows a view into one of the storage chambers. Grey wasteland draws the picture, one recognizes big grey concrete containers. Everything unspectacular. And yet it does not inspire much confidence.
Then it goes on the way back through the galleries. The rock on the gallery wall shows strong fracturation. At its foot are gravel filled trenches. The rock carry water. The quantity is still insignificant as long as the plant can be maintained and the water can be pumped out. There is no time for questions about the characteristics of the installation, the rock properties or the water inflows. It goes back to the receiving station.
The visit does not leave a good impression. The water inflows are reminiscent of earlier statements by landfill engineers and geologists that even hazardous waste landfills could be packed safely and forever. The picture of the remediation of the Bonfol and Koelliken hazardous waste landfills comes up. There, too, it was said that the plants were safe for eternity. Language has always helped to shape reality. It is ambiguous and flexible, and should therefore be used with caution, especially with such statements. As soon as the mentioned landfills were monitored, the first contamination of the groundwater was detected. Surveillance – the so-called monitoring of installations – was never desired and was therefore not planned.
Also with the Swedish planners: Information on monitoring the SFR repository is therefore lacking. Also in the exhibition area. In a document of the Swedish SKB from 2016 on the repository for high-level waste it can be read that “the repository should not require any monitoring or maintenance”. The operator believes in his safety concept and his calculations. Also for the repository for low and intermediate level waste. So why provide for complex programs for long-term monitoring? In view of the numerous cases of landfill remediation, the only question is how long it will take before such a repository is contaminated with radioactive substances and has to be dismantled. One can also ask oneself how long it will be before the Swedish authorities, under pressure from civil society, have to order long-term monitoring programmes.
The visit to the repository at Forsmark therefore ends disappointingly. SFR can already be regarded today as a future case of remediation. In any case, it is no longer a model site that would attract Swiss visitors: Nagra has long since stopped its controversial advertising visits to the north – Swiss guests from politics, administration and the media prefer to go to so-called dry mines in Germany, rather than to underground facilities such as the Äspö rock laboratory, where you even need an umbrella when visiting.
Finland: The visit to the Finnish repository for low and intermediate level waste took place on 27 May 2019. Posiva decided in advance upon request that it was unfortunately not possible to visit the Onkalo repository for high-level radioactive waste currently under construction. A friendly trio of scientists and information officers welcomed us to the “guided tour”. Lecture, visit of the exhibition in the information pavilion with a view of the nuclear facilities in Olkiluoto (Figure 6), confirmation that the highly active storage facility under construction in Onkalo could not be visited, and afterwards visit of the repository for low and intermediate level waste. The history of the repository dates back to the 1980s, when the search for a site began. This was followed by the first site investigations up to the beginning of the 1990s, followed by detailed investigations up to the year 2000 – for which site and repository and in which sequence the investigations took place is not clear from the website mentioned above. 
Figure 6: Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, from right to left: Reactors 2 and 1, on the left the 1600 MWe EPR in the final construction phase, on the far left in the foreground the wet storage facility for radioactive fuel elements (“spent fuel”), photo (for free use with reference to the article) : M. Buser.
The exhibition and the walk into the depths are very similar to the visit to the Swedish plant. However, the exhibition in the information pavilion in Olkiluoto and in the former research gallery of the repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste is much more comprehensive and better documented than in the Swedish counterpart (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Exhibition with poster wall on the repository for low- and intermediate-level waste, in the foreground right 200-l storage barrel, photo (for free use, stating the article) : M. Buser.
In terms of content, one basically doesn’t learn much more. The concepts pursued are de facto identical, two deep silos in which the two large waste categories “low level radioactive” and “intermediate level radioactive” are stored (Figure 8). Inventory identical. Packaging materials as well. And so are the containers. The content and variability of the waste and packaging materials are not the subject of the information. As in Sweden, a collection of wastes encapsulated in concrete. The usual organic substances are also present, from ion exchange resins with the filtered residue from the reactor’s primary circuit to raw waste such as industrial waste and work clothing.
Figure 8: Exhibition model of a repository for low- and intermediate-level waste, with the transport ramps, the ventilation and lift shaft, a so-called research gallery, which today serves as an underground exhibition space, and then the hall above the two “concrete buckets”, with the separate waste categories “low-level” and “intermediate-level”. Photo (for free use with reference to the article) : M. Buser.
The implementation and storage in the fissured granite rocks of the Fennoscandian Shield differs only slightly from the Swedish model. Flat ramp to drive the heavy containers to the repository. Two silos, like large buckets embedded in the ground (Figure 9). One for the low-, one for the intermediate-active waste.
Figure 9: The two storage silos into which storage containers with drums embedded in concrete are stacked. Photo (for free use with reference to the article): M. Buser.
The installation is well maintained. Optically, everything is neat and tidy, as in a Swiss installation (Figure 10). In spite of ventilation it smells however: the ion exchange resins, perhaps also other more. But the real problems lie elsewhere.
Figure 10: Hall above the two silos with the crane runway for loading the two silos. Photo (for free use with reference to the article): M. Buser.
The rock seems a bit more varied than its Swedish counterpart. Sometimes mighty quartzite bands cross the monotonous grey gneisses. Larger fissures are easily visible in the rock. Groundwater flows into the galleries at many of these points. The vegetation with bright green algae and mosses and the yellowish bacterial mucilages impressively show the distribution and regularity of the inflows. During the visit, you won’t learn anything about water management. The water is there. It must somehow be drained or pumped off. It simply has to go away.
Figure 11: Former research gallery and today’s exhibition area with water inflows, puddles and drainage pipes and a brightly coloured biology. Photo (for free use with reference to the article): M. Buser.
Sometime in the next decades the plant will be filled with concrete and then closed. The groundwater will then enter the storage silos and reach the waste. The storage experiment begins on a scale of 1 to 1. How long does it take for the entire plant to dam up? What are the effects of the lifting of the Baltic shield on the reactivation of fissures and damage to the concrete structure? When does the brackish groundwater penetrate through the concrete lining of the silos, through the cement filling to the storage containers and into the pores of the cement containers with the stored waste? What happens to the cement? What happens to the stored organic substances, such as the ion exchange resins? What goes into solution and is transported out of the accumulated plant? The exhibition provides no answers to these numerous questions.
Figure 12: Picture on a billboard in the hall: the concrete-lined silo for low-level waste from above, the pulley block with the filling station on the right. On the left and in the upper part uncovered containers with drums. Photo (for free use with reference to the article): M. Buser.
TVO, one of the two operators of the Finnish nuclear power plants, has been carrying out studies since 1997 on the effects of the cement’s behaviour under the conditions of full back-up of the silos. However, the results are not visible on the billboard of the underground exhibition. A simple model of the multiple barriers shown on the poster is intended to convey safety. The entire protective effect of the “end” storage facility is based on the concrete solidified waste, which is enclosed by a concrete container in a concrete silo that will be filled with concrete and is to close the cavities between the concrete-lined silo and the storage containers. This concrete structure is fatally reminiscent of the barrel storage facility filled with concrete containing waste from the Basel chemical industry at the Teuftal hazardous waste landfill near Mühleberg in the canton of Berne, which has a similar structure and was also designed for “eternity”. Dozens of meters of waste are superimposed. With the small difference that the planners were aware that water would penetrate into the concrete coffin and that the pollutants would slowly be washed out. In this case, too, the chemistry gnaws at the concrete and will “soften” this step by step. And at some point, the waste from the dismantling of nuclear power plants will also be stored down here, exacerbating the problems massively in terms of storage times.
Figure 13: Safety through multibarriers? The drum storage concept of the concrete coffin of the Olkiluoto repository. Photo (for free use with reference to the article) : M. Buser.
Of course, the entire storage concept does not require any monitoring equipment. No monitoring boreholes around the repositry, which would enable the hydraulics and the chemical composition of the site to be continuously monitored. No monitoring of critical gas production of waste such as ion exchange resins, which are undoubtedly a preferred substrate for biological attack on organic matter. Above all, there is no thought that this experiment could go wrong on a scale of 1 to 1. Like their colleagues in Sweden, there is total confidence in Finland. They trust the “safety case”, which calculates the doses that could at best be taken “outside” in the distant future. What is going to go wrong? Everything is under control. You can simply leave the concrete coffin to itself: Technological overconfidence in pure culture.
In the afternoon, we were bid farewell by the management crew as kindly as we had been received in the morning. The visit gave us an interesting insight into this facility. Unfortunately, we did not get the opportunity to visit the high-active repository under construction. The surprise was all the greater when Miriam Staudte, a green member of Lower Saxony’s state parliament, called us in the afternoon of the same day to tell us that she was visiting Onkalo ….  This is called information at the right time.
A few final thoughts
A visit to the two repositories for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste can only raise questions and concerns. From the point of view of the paradigm of “final disposal”, we are still far into the last century – even the development of more modern landfills with their comprehensive monitoring programmes has apparently not yet arrived in the far north. The French nuclear landfills are also at least diligently inspected and monitored. Interestingly, the so-called leading Swedish and Finnish repository programmes neglect the question of monitoring and long-term monitoring of such a facility and rely entirely on a model proof of the effects.
The attempt to model the processes of the leaching of pollutants, their transport and their uptake into the biosphere is a commendable project. Models make it possible to better understand the development and behaviour of a system up to a certain point and to identify key parameters. However, models and modelling reach their limits when trying to make forecasts for the future – and above all for the distant future. Forecasts therefore become increasingly blurred as the time periods considered become longer. All the more reasons to question the models on which such predictions are based. A particularly impressive example of a misguided model is the so-called TSPA model (Total System Performance Assessment), which was developed in connection with the American repository project in Yucca Mountain. ” The TSPA had taken the phrase ‘garbage in/garbage out’ to a wildly new level” writes Judy Treichel, Managing Director of the Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force, in a recent newspaper article. If you consider the architecture of this model unbiased, you cannot contradict this devastating verdict.
Figure 14: The TSPA model (Total System Performance Assessment), which uses a complex and completely disjointed model to calculate dose-forecasts (see also https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237552920_TOTAL_SYSTEM_PERFORMANCE_ASSESSMENT_TSPA_FOR_THE_SITE_RECOMMENDATION [06/21/2019])
But also more obvious considerations show how we humans construct our environment and sometimes ignore evidence. Above all, the great successes of technology and the unexpected possibilities of modelling have deprived modern science of one of its most valuable instruments at its work: simple observation (Figure 15). In view of the long-term effects of hazardous technologies and especially in connection with projects for the “disposal” of radioactive and chemotoxic waste, particular importance should be attached to this insight. Humans think, yes, without doubt, but many other things drives. Let us therefore conclude that we are all somewhat more modest when it comes to our capabilities and our predictions for the future.
Figure 15: People think, algae, fungi and moss drives. Photo (for free use with reference to the article): M. Buser.
 See also Buser, Marcos (2016): Endlagerung radio- und chemo-toxischer Abfälle im Tiefuntergrund. Wissenschaftlich-technische, planerisch-organisatorische und strukturelle Schwachstellen. Eine Beurteilung vier ausgewählter Fallbeispiele, Greenpeace Deutschland; Buser, Marcos (2017): Short-term und long-term Governance als Spannungsfeld bei der Entsorgung chemo-toxischer Abfälle. Vergleichende Fallstudie zu Entsorgungs-Projekten in der Schweiz und Frankreich: DMS St-Ursanne und das Bergwerk Felsenau (beide Schweiz) und Stocamine (Frankreich), ITAS-Entria-Arbeitsbericht 2017-02; Buser, M. & Wildi, W. 2018: Du stockage des déchets toxiques dans des dépôts géologiques profonds. Science et pseudo-sciences, vol. 324, p. 33-41. Download: https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:104012
 DOE (2014a): Accident Investigation Report, Underground Salt Haul Truck Fire at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant on February 5, 2014, Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, March 2014
 DOE (2014b): Accident Investigation Report, Phase 1, Radiological Release Event at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant on February 14, 2014, Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, April 2014; DOE (2015): Accident Investigation Report, Phase 2, Radiological Release Event at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant on February 14, 2014, Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, April 2015
 Ialenti, Vincent (2018): Waste makes haste, How a campaign to speed up nuclear waste shipments shut down the WIPP long-term repository, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74
 Copil (2011) : Rapport d’expertise, juillet 2011, deutsche Version, https://www.grand-est.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_final_COPIL.pdf (17.06.2019)
 SKB (2016): UVE für das KBS-3-System – nicht-technische Zusammenfassung, SKB Public Report, aktualisiert Oktober 2015, S. 5 https://www.skb.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/UVE-für-das-KBS-3-System-–-nichttechnischeZusammenfassung.pdf (6.6.2019)
 Mündliche Information der Besuchsleiterin am 23. Mai 2019
 SKB (2016): UVE für das KBS-3-System – nicht-technische Zusammenfassung, SKB Public Report, aktualisiert Oktober 2015, S. 3 https://www.skb.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/UVE-für-das-KBS-3-System-–-nichttechnischeZusammenfassung.pdf (6.6.2019)
 Ausgestrahlt, Info-Mail „Standortsuche vom 13. Juni 2019